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1. ‘Leaders’ and ‘Policymakers’ 
 
Trump has promised to ‘make America great again’. As a self-proclaimed expert on everything of import (see 
video clip), he knows exactly how to increase domestic investment and consumption, boost exports, reduce the 
country’s trade deficit, expand employment and bolster wages. And as America’s leader-and-policymaker-in-
chief, he has taken the necessary steps to achieve every one of these goals. He has lowered taxes on corporations 
and the rich to induce greater investment, relaxed environmental standards and de-socialized medical care to 
cut red tape and eliminate waste, curtailed civilian government spending and raised military expenditures to 
make government lean and mean, warned corporations and individuals to remain economically patriotic and 
undermined the Fed’s ‘independence’ to prevent interest rates from rising and the stock market from tanking. 
And if that wasn’t enough, he has also launched a so-called trade war to prevent America from being ripped off 
by other countries, especially China.  
Capitalists and pundits follow him like imprinted ducks. His tweets rattle markets, his announcements are 
dissected by academics and his utterances are analysed to exhaustion by various media. A visiting alien might 
infer that he actually runs the world. 
And the alien wouldn’t be alone. The earthly population too, conditioned by ivory-tower academics and 
popular opinion makers, tends to think of political figureheads as ‘leaders’ and ‘policymakers’. Situated at the 
‘commanding heights’ of their respective nation states and international organizations, these ‘leaders’ suppos-
edly set the rules, make policies, steer their societies and determine the course of history. Or at least that’s the 
belief. 
The reality, though, is quite different. The relentless spread of the capitalist mode of power has long robbed 
formal politics of its past glory. Contrary to the conventional creed, political figureheads nowadays have little 
leverage and almost no autonomy. They have become predicable subjects, glorified media pawns whose bureau-
cratic position subjugates them to a systemic logic they rarely understand but duly obey. Even erratic, ‘self-made-
know-it-all’ characters like Trump cannot veer too far from the capitalized script – lest they be reprimanded or 
simply purged in a capitalist backlash. 
Note that our point here is not that formal politics cannot change the world, but that it cannot do so without 
significantly transforming the capitalist mode of power in which it is embedded. And such a transformation is 
something that most present-day politicians cannot even contemplate, let alone achieve.  
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2. Differential Profit 
 
Begin with profit. According to former U.S. President Calvin Coolidge, ‘the chief business of the American 
people is business’. His proposition, made in 1925, has since become the ideology and praxis of nearly all nation 
states on earth. And given that business is ultimately about profit, the ‘greatness’ of a country must be judged by 
its differential profit – in this case, the profit its capitalists earn relative to those earned by capitalists in other coun-
tries.  
Figure 1 offers a historical overview of this differential, showing the global distribution of net corporate 
profit between firms listed in (1) the United States, (2) developed markets excluding the United States and (3) 
the rest of the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Net Profit Shares of Listed Corporations (% of World Total) 
 
NOTE: This chart is updated from Bichler and Nitzan (2012b: Figure 3, p. 59). Net profit is computed as the ratio of market 
value to the price-earnings ratio. Data for developed markets excluding the U.S. are calculated by subtracting from the profit 
of firms listed in developed markets the profit of firms listed in the U.S. Data for rest of the world are calculated by subtracting 
from the profit of all firms the profit of those listed in developed markets. Series display monthly data and are smoothed as 
12-month trailing averages. The underlying earnings data are reported on a consolidated basis, including domestic and for-
eign subsidiaries and the equity share in minority-held firms. The last data points are for December 2018.  
 
SOURCE: Datastream (series code: TOTMKWD(MV) and TOTMKWD(PE) for the market value and price-earnings ratio 
of all listed firms, respectively; TOTMKUS(MV) and TOTMKUS(PE) for the market value and price-earnings ratio of U.S.-
listed firms, respectively; TOTMKDV(MV) and TOTMKDV(PE) for the market value and price-earnings ratio of firms listed 
in developed countries, respectively).  
 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, U.S. corporate owners still reigned supreme, earning over 60 per cent of 
all net profit recorded by listed firms around the world. But with the ascent of other developed markets in the 
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late 1980s and the rise of emerging markets since the early 1990s, U.S. differential earnings dropped sharply, 
falling to 30 to 35 per cent of the total in recent years (as a side note, notice the embarrassing 2016-18 downtick 
during the Trump presidency). 
Judging by this chart, and assuming that a country’s ‘greatness’ indeed equals its differential business suc-
cess, it’s clear that America is no longer great – or at least not as great as it once was. 
 
3. The Exchange Rate 
 
Could this fall from grace be blamed on the weakening dollar (Francis, Bichler, and Nitzan 2009-2010)? After 
all, when the U.S.’s ‘real’ effective exchange rate depreciates – in other words, when the dollar’s value falls 
relative to a basket of traded currencies adjusted for their respective consumer prices – non-U.S. firms charge 
relatively higher prices than U.S. firms do and/or convert their local-currency earnings to more U.S. dollars, 
thus causing the U.S. share of global profit to fall – and vice versa when the ‘real’ effective exchange rate appre-
ciates (the ‘real’ effective exchange rate of a country depreciates/appreciates with a fall/rise in its nominal ex-
change rate, as well as when domestic prices decline/increase relative to foreign ones). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Net Profit Shares of U.S. Listed Corporations (% of World Total) and the Real Effective Exchange Rate 
 
NOTE: Net profit is computed as the ratio of market value to the price-earnings ratio. Series display monthly data and are 
smoothed as 12-month trailing averages. The raw earnings data are reported on a consolidated basis, including domestic and 
foreign subsidiaries and the equity share in minority-held firms. The last data points are for December 2018.  
 
SOURCE: Datastream (series code: TOTMKWD(MV) and TOTMKWD(PE) for the market value and price-earnings ratio 
of all listed firms, respectively; TOTMKUS(MV) and TOTMKUS(PE) for the market value and price-earnings ratio of U.S.-
listed firms, respectively; IMF’s International Financial Statistics via DataInsight (series code: LRE_C_C111 for the CPI-based 
real effective exchange rate of the U.S. dollar).  
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Figure 2 shows this impact by contrasting the global profit share of U.S.-listed firms on the right-hand scale 
with their country’s ‘real’ effective exchange rate on the left, and according to the chart the two series indeed 
correlate positively. But the correlation is entirely cyclical. The long-term trends are not correlated at all: during 
the past half-century, the exchange rate moved sideways (starting at 100 in 1973 and ending at 103 in 2018), 
while the global profit share dropped perceptibly (beginning at 57.9 per cent in 1973 and ending at 33.3 per cent 
in 2018). In other words, America’s fall from business grace can hardly be blamed on its currency.  
 
4. Going Public 
 
Another possible culprit for the falling U.S. profit share has to do with the rapid public listing of non-U.S. firms 
(Francis, Bichler, and Nitzan 2009-2010). Note that the underlying profit series in Figures 1 and 2 pertain to 
listed (i.e. publicly traded) firms only; they do not include the earnings of unlisted (private) firms. Now, until the 
onset of neoliberalism in the 1980s and the emerging-markets boom of the 1990s, many non-U.S. firms, includ-
ing large ones, were unlisted, which means that their profit, however large, is excluded from our non-U.S. series 
here and therefore makes the U.S. profit share in that earlier period look bigger than it actually was. With the 
spread of neoliberalism, though, existing stock markets started to boom, new ones were established, and more 
and more non-U.S. firms began listing their shares for the first time. The tide of new listings converted privately 
held earnings to publicly traded profit, thus augmenting the aggregate profit of non-U.S. listed companies – but 
this augmentation, one might argue, is an accounting formality and should not be interpreted as a sign of U.S. 
decline.  
On closer inspection, though, it is clear that what we are dealing with here involves more than mere ac-
counting. Corporate listing makes the underlying assets – and therefore the power they represent – vendible, 
malleable, connectable and leverageable in ways that private unlisted assets can never be. And if this claim is 
correct, that means that the very listing of non-U.S. firms represents an increase in their power and therefore a 
comparable reduction in the differential stature of U.S.-listed firms. 
 
5. Trojan Horses 
 
And that’s not the end of it. As it turns out, many U.S.-listed corporations are not ‘American’ but ‘foreign’ 
(assuming this distinction is meaningful to start with). Note that the firms represented in Figures 2 and 3 are 
grouped based on where they are listed rather than where they are incorporated. In most countries, listed firms 
are almost always domestically incorporated, so this distinction is immaterial. But it certainly matters in global 
financial centres such as the United States, whose stock markets are home to many ‘Trojan horses’: locally listed 
firms that are incorporated elsewhere. And the crucial point for our purpose here is that the proportion of such 
firms has tended to rise in recent decades.  
Based on the U.S. Compustat file, in 1950 foreign-incorporated firms accounted for only 4 per cent of the 
country’s top 500 listed corporations. But that number grew rapidly: it rose to 14 per cent of the total in 1980, 
26 per cent in 1990, 41 per cent in 2000 and 48 per cent in 2010 (Bichler and Nitzan 2012a: 52). Other financial 
centres such as the United Kingdom and Hong Kong may have seen a similar increase, but because most of their 
Trojan horses are not U.S.-incorporated, this increase does not affect our argument here. 
The net effect of this process is that the global profit share of ‘purely’ American firms – i.e., firms that are 
both listed and incorporated in the United States – probably declined faster than the share of all U.S.-listed firms 
(regardless of incorporation) as shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
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6. Breaking the National Envelope 
 
All in all, then, the global decline of so-called American firms is real enough. And paradoxically, this decline is 
intimately related to a seemingly opposite process: the growing dependency of these very ‘American’ firms on 
foreign operations.  
This latter process is shown in Figure 3. The top series measures the share of U.S. corporate profit coming 
from foreign subsidiaries, while the bottom series estimates the share earned from exports.  
In the mid-1940s, both measures hovered around 7 per cent. The United States was still a relatively closed 
economy with an expanding population, rising ‘real’ wages and rapidly growing GDP per capita. In this context, 
U.S. firms looked mostly inward, earning over 85 per cent of their profit from domestic operations.  
But the relentless drive of large firms to augment their capitalized power over the underlying population 
mandated ‘strategic sabotage’ in the form of rising unemployment and slowing growth (as examined in Nitzan 
and Bichler 2014 and illustrated in this 2019 video), while their the quest for differential accumulation relative 
to lesser firms set in motion a merger and acquisition uptrend that eventually made them ‘too big’ for the decel-
erating U.S. market (Nitzan 2001; Nitzan and Bichler 2009: Part V). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. U.S. Corporate Dependency on Foreign Profit: Foreign Operations vs Exports 
 
NOTE: This chart is revised and updated from Nitzan and Bichler (2009: Figure 15.6, p. 357). Profit from foreign operations 
denotes receipts from the rest of the world as a per cent of corporate profit after tax. Profit from exports is estimated by the 
export share of GDP. Series are smoothed as 5-year trailing averages. The last data points are for 2018.  
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global Insight (series codes: ZBECONRWRCT for after-tax corpo-
rate profit receipts from the rest of the world; ZA for after-tax corporate profit; X for exports; GDP for GDP). 
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This differential power process, we argue, is key to understanding the exponential rise in the share of foreign 
corporate profit shown by the top series in Figure 3. Having exhausted the most lucrative takeover targets in 
their home country, and with their home country stagnating and therefore not generating new takeover targets 
at a fast enough rate, large U.S. firms have had no choice but to break the national envelope and go global. They 
started taking over foreign firms at an ever increasing rate (most FDI occurs via mergers and acquisitions rather 
than greenfield investment), and as the process accelerated the share of foreign profit rose dramatically. Foreign 
operations currently account for roughly half of all U.S. corporate profit, and if the uptrend persists the so-called 
American firm will soon become a misnomer. 
 
7. Making America Great Again 
 
Can Trump reverse or even dent this historical evisceration of ‘America’? The short answer is no. So far, his 
policies have only hastened this evisceration, accelerating the upward redistribution of income and amplifying 
the de-Americanization of U.S. corporations. During his three years in office, the share of foreign profit, instead 
of falling, has risen dramatically, moving toward a new all-time high (final red segment in the top series of 
Figure 3). Based on his record, it is no wonder that the U.S. ‘business community’, and particularly its leading 
firms, are firmly behind him. 
The only hair in the soup is his so-called trade war against China. On the face of it, this ‘war’ looks like a 
flash-in-the-pan media stunt. China is unlikely to succumb in any meaningful way – and even if it does, exports 
are a sideshow for U.S. corporations (bottom series in Figure 3), so the overall impact on the global profit share 
of U.S. firms is likely to be marginal. 
But international trade is not an isolated process. The ‘free’ (read corporate-determined) flow of commodi-
ties is the bedrock of ‘free’ (read corporate-determined) foreign investment, and if Trump’s trade war develops 
into a full-scale investment war, all bets will be off. At that point, and assuming he is still there, the maker of a 
great-again-America will likely be pressured to reverse course or lose the presidency. 
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